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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WARD PERKINS, Personal
Representative of the
estate of Norma Perkins,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
:
LINCOLN NATIONAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Case No. 890732-CA

:

:

Category 14b

:

Defendant/Respondent,
and
GREAT-WEST LIFE ASSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant/Appellant.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF TO
RESPONDENT PERKINS' BRIEF
Appellant Great-West Life Assurance Company ("Great-West"), by
and through Clark W. Sessions and Cynthia K.C. Meyer of Campbell
Maack & Sessions, its attorneys of record, submits the following
reply to the brief of Respondent Perkins.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Insurance companies have the fundamental right to determine
the risks they will insure.

Legions of cases uphold insurance

companies' denial of coverage when conditions precedent to coverage
have not been met.

Great-West contracted with Southwest Health

Management Company, Inc. ("Southwest"), to insure the latter's

210194K.PL2
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employees actively at work.

The active work requirement is a

condition precedent to coverage, not an exclusion from coverage
already in place.
The group health and life insurance policy underwritten by
Great-West was non-contributory; that is, employees such as Norma
Perkins did not pay the premium amounts to Great-West.

Southwest

paid the premiums. Great-West refunded the premiums paid on behalf
of Norma Perkins to Southwest.
refund check.

Southwest negotiated the premium

Respondent Ward Perkins' ("Mr. Perkins") argument

that Great-West retained the premiums paid by Norma Perkins and did
not

refund

unavailing.

the

premiums

to Mrs. Perkins

or

her

estate

is

Mrs. Perkins did not pay the premiums and Great-West

did not refund the premiums to Mrs. Perkins or her estate because
they were not paid by her.
Southwest's

characterization

of Mrs. Perkins' employment

status, Mrs. Perkins' hopes or intentions to return to work, and
her doctor's hopes or intentions for Mrs. Perkins' return to work
are irrelevant.

Indeed, Mrs. Perkins' intentions or hopes are not

legally within the knowledge of Mr. Perkins, Southwest, or Mrs.
Perkins' medical doctor.

The fact that Mrs. Perkins was not

actively at work after June 3, 1986, is undisputed and entitles
Great-West to judgment in its favor. Great-West first learned that
Mrs. Perkins' last date of active employment was June 3, 1986, when
it received the Life Claim Report submitted to Great-West by
Southwest on Mr. Perkins' behalf. Great-West did not know nor did
it have reason to know until it received the Life Claim Report that
Norma Perkins' last date of active employment was June 3, 1986.
210194K.PL2
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Great-West distributed the EDGE policy booklets to Southwest
for distribution in turn to Southwest employees enrolled in the
group health and life insurance program underwritten by Great-West.
Great-West's

contract was with

Southwest, and

not with the

individual members of the group, and it was not required to
directly submit each policy booklet to each employee. Southwest,
however, may have had a duty to distribute the policy booklets to
the employees enrolled in the group health and life insurance
program.

Although Mr. Perkins argues that Mrs. Perkins was not

aware of the information contained in the EDGE booklet, Mr. Perkins
submitted no affidavits in conformance with Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(e) stating that Mrs. Perkins was in fact unaware of
the policy provisions.1
ARGUMENT
POINT I
GREAT-WEST CONTRACTED TO INSURE ONLY
EMPLOYEES WHO WERE ACTIVELY AT WORK
Insurance companies have the fundamental right to determine
the risks they will insure. The Utah Supreme Court in Marriott v.
Pacific Nat'l Life, 24 Utah 2d 182, 467 P.2d 981 (1970), recognized
this right in stating that it is not unreasonable for insurance
companies to impose rules as to eligibility so that coverage is
only on regular employees of the work force.

467 P.2d at 983.

Group insurers justifiably rely on insureds' active employment as
an indication of their relative good health and insurability. See
1

It is highly questionable whether such an affidavit could
pass muster given its hearsay nature and the probabilities of Utah
Rule of Evidence 601.
210194K.PL2
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Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 41 (1981); Credeur v.
Continental Assurance Co., 502 So. 2d 214, 218 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
Furthermore, legions of cases have upheld insurance companies'
denial of coverage when conditions precedent to coverage were not
met.

See, e.g., cases cited and discussed at pages 15 through 27

of Brief of Appellant.
Great-West contracted with Southwest (not with the individual
Southwest employees) to insure those employees actively at work as
defined in the policy.
policy exclusion.

The active employment requirement is not a

It is a condition precedent to coverage—a

requirement for eligibility. Thus, General Motors Acceptance Corp.
v. Martinez, 668 P.2d 498 (Utah 1983), relied on by Mr. Perkins is
distinguishable.

In that case, Mr. Martinez was denied benefits

under his credit life and disability policy because of a preexisting condition.

The pre-existing condition exclusion in

Martinez was an exclusion of which Mr. Martinez was unaware due to
what can only be characterized as the insurance agent's gross
negligence.

See id. at 500. Mr. Martinez purchased an automobile

on a conditional sales contract and was told that in order to
obtain financing, he had to purchase a credit life and disability
insurance policy.

Mr. Martinez was not informed of the exclusion

for pre-existing conditions.

The car dealer's agent did not

inquire as to Mr. Martinez' past or present health, Mr. Martinez
was not asked to sign the credit insurance application which listed
the coverage exclusions, nor was he provided with a copy of the
insurance application or the certificate of insurance.

Id.

Utah

Code Ann. § 31-34-6(1) required all credit life or credit accident
210194K.PL2
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and health insurance to be evidenced by an individual policy to be
delivered to the debtor.

The court stated:

Because those who purchase such [credit life]
policies rely on the assumption that they are
covered by the insurance they buy, the
Legislature, in the interest of fair dealing,
has deemed it mandatory that an insured be
given a copy of the policy so that he can take
whatever action is appropriate to protect his
interests and be assured that the coverage
which he thinks he has contracted for is
actually provided. It is not consonant with
our statute for an insurance company to accept
premiums and then deny liability on the ground
of an exclusion of which the insured was not
aware because the insurer had never informed
him of the exclusion or given him the means to
ascertain its existence.
Id. at 501 (emphasis added).

The court then held:

In view of these reasons and the
unequivocal nature of the duty imposed by §
31-34-6, we hold that an insurance company is
estopped from relying upon an exclusion in a
policy if the company has failed to deliver
the policy or certificate of insurance to the
insured or any other documents stating the
exclusion.
Id. Obviously, the facts in Martinez are distinguishable from the
facts in this case.

In Martinez, a statute required copies of the

credit life policy or certificate of insurance containing any
exclusions to be delivered directly to each individual insured.
The insurance policy in Martinez was apparently an individual
policy

rather

than

a

group

policy.

Furthermore,

the

car

dealership/insurance agent did not so much as require Mr. Martinez
to sign the application for insurance coverage which set forth the
exclusions.

Martinez is not applicable to this case.

factually and legally distinguishable.

It is

In fact, in Todd v. Dow

Chemical Co., 760 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1985), the court held that the
210194K.PL2
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doctrines of waiver and estoppel "usually cannot operate to extend
coverage where none exists under the contract."
(citations omitted).

Id. at 195

The coverage under the Great-West policy

never extended to Mrs. Perkins because she was not eligible for
coverage in the first instance.
Mr. Perkins simply cannot clear the first hurdle which is
showing that Mrs. Perkins was actively at work on the effective
date of Great-West's coverage.

Mrs. Perkins' last date of active

employment was June 3, 1986f some 27 days prior to Great-West's
coverage taking effect as to any employee of Southwest.

(Exhibit

A to Memorandum in support of Great-West Life Assurance Company's
Motion for Summary Judgment; record at 7, 62, 71).
POINT II
NORMA PERKINS DID NOT PAY ANT PREMIUMS TO
GREAT-WEST AND ALL PREMIUMS PAID ON HER
BEHALF BT SOUTHWEST WERE REFUNDED TO SOUTHWEST
Mr. Perkins states over and over in his brief that Mrs.
Perkins paid premiums to Great-West and that Great-West did not
return the premiums to Mrs. Perkins or her personal representative.
Mr. Perkins characterizes these facts as undisputed.

See Brief of

Appellee Perkins at 4, 5, 6, 7 and 11. It is true that there is no
dispute as to who paid premiums and to whom the premiums were
refunded.

Contrary to Mr. Perkins' assertions, however, Mrs.

Perkins did not pay any premiums to Great-West. Southwest did. It
is true that Great-West did not refund the premiums to Mrs. Perkins
or her estate.

Great-West refunded the premiums to Southwest who

negotiated the refund check.
210194K.PL2
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Two points must be made concerning Mr. Perkins' statements
concerning the payment and refund of premiums. First, this case is
before this Court on appeal from summary judgment entered in favor
of Mr. Perkins. Mr. Perkins submitted below absolutely no support
for his statement that Mrs. Perkins paid premium amounts. GreatWest, on the other hand, submitted an affidavit of John Kingsbury,
who stated under oath that the policy was non-contributory, that
is, that the employer pays 100 percent of the premiums, and
attached a copy of the master card showing that coverage was noncontributory and that premiums were to be paid 100% by Southwest.
Mr. Kingsbury also stated that a refund check was submitted to
Southwest for the full premiums paid on Mrs. Perkins' behalf, and
that the refund check was negotiated by Southwest (record at 16970)

There is no genuine

refunded the premiums.

dispute as to who paid and to whom were
The only properly supported

factual

statements submitted in the court below were submitted by GreatWest, not by Mr. Perkins.
POINT III
SOUTHWEST'S CHARACTERIZATION OF MRS. PERKINS'
EMPLOYMENT STATUS, MRS. PERKINS' HOPES TO RETURN
TO WORK AND HER DOCTOR'S INTENTIONS ARE IRRELEVANT
In clear and unambiguous language, the group health and life
insurance policy underwritten by Great-West provides that employees
are eligible

for coverage

if, among other things, they are

permanent and full-time employees working the minimum number of
hours per week. In equally unambiguous language, the policy states
that coverage begins on the date the employee completes the
eligibility waiting period unless the employee is not at work on
210194K.PL2
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that day in which case the coverage begins when the employee
returns to work.

(Exhibit D to Memorandum in Support of Great-West

Life

Company's

Assurance

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment,

also

reproduced in Appendix 3 to Brief of Appellant, at p. 17A). The
qualification section of the Schedule of Benefits states:
Qualification: You must Work 32 hours per week to qualify as
a permanent, full-time full pay Employee. The
Work must be performed at a location other
than your home.
(Id. at p. 1 of the Schedule of Benefits).

The Schedule of

Benefits also defines the eligibility waiting period for active
employees as the later of the plan effective date (in this case,
July 1, 1986) and

"the first day of the insurance month coinciding

with or next after the date you complete 90 days of continuous
service."

(Id.) Since Mrs. Perkins had been continuously employed

by Southwest for many years prior to the plan's effective date, her
coverage would have commenced on July 1, 1986, if she had been at
work on that day.

It is undisputed that Mrs. Perkins was not at

work on July 1, 1986, and never returned to work.
Mr. Perkins argues, however, that since (1) Mrs. Perkins
intended to return to work, (2) Mrs. Perkins' doctor expected her
to return to work, (3) Southwest considered Mrs. Perkins to be an
active employee even though she was on disability leave, and (4)
Mrs. Perkins was receiving accrued sick leave and vacation pay, she
was an active employee entitled to coverage under the Great-West
policy.

These arguments fail for several reasons.

First, after June 3, 1986, Mrs. Perkins did not work a minimum
of 32 hours per week and she apparently was not paid her regular

210194K.PL2
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salary or wages; thus she did not satisfy the basic eligibility
requirements of full-time, full pay active employment at a minimum
32 hours per week.

This, alone, is fatal to Mr. Perkins' claim.

Mrs. Perkins' hopes to return to work and her doctor's and
employer's expectations and characterizations of her employment
status are simply irrelevant.

In Elsey v. Prudential Insurance

Company of America. 262 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1958), cited in Brief
of Appellant, the Court of Appeals, in upholding a denial of
coverage, held that "actively at work on full-time" means "actually
on the job and performing the employee's customary work," and that
"being on the payroll is not enough."

Id. at 435.

Mrs. Perkins

apparently was not even on the payroll after her disability leave
began.

See, e.g. . record at 33 (Affidavit of Mark Toohey dated

August 30, 1988, indicating that Mrs. Perkins was paid accrued sick
leave and vacation during her disability leave).
Second, since Mrs. Perkins never returned to work, she never
became eligible for coverage.

It was Southwest who first alerted

Great-West that Mrs. Perkins' last date of active employment was
June 3, 1986, some 27 days before the effective date of coverage
under the Great-West policy.

Had she returned to work, her

effective date of coverage would have begun on the date she
returned to work.

(Exhibit D to Memorandum in Support of Great-

West's Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 17A).
Third, Mrs. Perkins' intentions or hopes were not properly
before the lower court.

Mr. Perkins made no representations

concerning Mrs. Perkins' intentions or hopes to return to work, as
indeed he could not.
210194K.PL2

Any statements attributable to Mrs. Perkins
9

constitute hearsay, and are not otherwise admissible under Utah's
Dead Man Rule, Utah Rule of Evidence 601.

Consequently, even if

Mr. Perkins had filed an affidavit in support of his motion for
summary judgment concerning Mrs. Perkins' hopes or intentions, such
statements would be improper and inadmissible under Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(e).
Simply put, since Mrs. Perkins was not actively at work on
July 1, 1986, the effective date of coverage, and never returned to
work prior to her passing, she was not covered under the group
health and life insurance policy underwritten by Great-West.
POINT IV
WHETHER MRS. PERKINS WAS UNAWARE OF POLICY PROVISIONS
WAS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT
Mr. Perkins contends that Mrs. Perkins was unaware of the
policy exclusions2
coverage.

and that fact estops Great-West from denying

Great-West submitted affidavit testimony that the EDGE

policy booklets were distributed to Southwest for distribution in
turn to the Southwest employees who applied for coverage under the
policy underwritten by Great-West.

(Record at 71). Mr. Perkins

submitted no affidavits below stating whether Mrs. Perkins had
knowledge of the provisions.

Indeed, any such statements would

have to be on Mr. Perkins' personal knowledge since Mrs. Perkins'
statements to him would constitute inadmissible hearsay.
Importantly, Great-West made information available to the
individual insureds by distributing the policy books to Southwest,
2

The eligibility requirement in the Great-West policy of
active, full-time, full pay employment is not an exclusion. It is
a condition precedent to coverage.
210194K.PL2
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the party with whom Great-West contracted.

Whether Southwest

distributed to policy booklets to the employees was not before the
lower court, but if Southwest breached its duty, perhaps Mr.
Perkins has a cause of action against Southwest as the plan
administrator.
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Larson v. Wycoff Co., 624
P.2d 1151 (Utah 1981), that
[a] party claiming an estoppel cannot rely on
representations or acts if they are contrary to his own
knowledge of the truth or if he had the means by which
with reasonable diligence he could ascertain the true
situation.
Id. at 1155 (emphasis added).

Even if Southwest did not distribute

the EDGE booklets and Mrs. Perkins did not have actual knowledge of
the policy provisions, with reasonable diligence she could have
become aware of the provisions by requesting the EDGE booklet from
Southwest.

It is uncontroverted that the means existed for Mrs.

Perkins to learn of the policy provisions.

Mr. Perkins submitted

only argument but no properly supported facts to the contrary.
Again, estoppel usually cannot extend insurance coverage where none
existed in the first place. Todd v. Dow Chemical Co. , 760 F.2d 192
(8th Cir. 1985) .
The Utah Supreme Court in Larson stated:
"Ordinarily, in the absence of prejudice to
the employee or of facts giving rise to
estoppel,
an
insurance
carrier,
may,
notwithstanding
voluntary
payment
of
compensation, the furnishing of hospital or
medical care, the entry of appearance, or
statement made that the policy covered the
employee, urge the defense that the employee
did not meet with an accident, or that the
policy did not cover the employment . . . . It
would be unjust to both the employee and the
210194K.PL2
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insurance carrier if the law were that when
the insurance carrier once undertakes to
provide medical or other care for an injured
workman it has lost all right to afterwards
defend against what it believes to be an
unjust or illegal claim,"
624 P.2d at 1155 (emphasis added) (quoting Harding v. Industrial
Comm'n of Utah, 83 Utah 376, 381, 28 P.2d 182, 184 (1934)).
Mr. Perkins has simply raised no facts giving rise to an
estoppel against Great-West.

Great-West made the policy books

available for distribution to its employees.

Southwest had the

responsibility to complete that distribution.
Mr. Perkins' reliance on U & I Properties. Inc. v. Republic
National Life Insurance Co., 10 Wash. App. 640, 519 P.2d 19 (Ct.
App. 1974), is misplaced and confused.

(See p. 6 of Brief of

Appellee Perkins). In U & I, the court reversed a finding in favor
of coverage.
Mr.

In addition, the sentence set off by parentheses in

Perkins' brief:

"(Mutual

Life

subsequently

approved

the

application, unaware of his death)," is actually a quote of the U
&

I court, referring to another case, Starr v. Mutual Life

Insurance Co. , 41 Wash. 228, 83 P. 116 (1905).
indicated

Finally, as

by Mr. Perkins, although the court recognized the

principle that insurers who retain premiums knowing of facts
voiding the policy may be bound by waiver or estoppel, the court
did not, in fact, hold that the insurer was estopped from denying
coverage.

The

Court

reversed

the

finding

of

coverage.

Significantly, Great-West did not retain premiums knowing of Mrs.
Perkins' work status. When Great-West learned that her last date
of active employment was June 3, 1986, on its receipt of the Life

210194K.PL2
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Claim Report, it denied the claim and thereafter refunded the
premiums.
Inasmuch

as Great-West

provided

the policy booklets to

Southwest for distribution to the employees, Mr. Perkins' estoppel
argument must fail.
CONCLUSION
Mrs. Perkins was not eligible for coverage under the GreatWest policy and never became eligible by returning to work.

She

did not pay the premiums to Great-West as the group life and health
insurance plan was non-contributory, and, in fact, the premiums
were refunded to

and accepted by Southwest.

The hopes and

expectations of Mrs. Perkins and her doctor and employer are simply
immaterial
coverage.

to

a

determination

Finally,

Mrs.

whether

she was

Perkins' knowledge

of

provisions was not factually supported below.
undisputed

that

Great-West

provided

the

eligible

policy

the

for

policy

Indeed, it is
booklets

to

Southwest for distribution to the employees.
For the reasons

set

forth herein

and

in the Brief of

Appellant, Great-West respectfully requests the relief requested in
Great-West's main brief.
Respectfully submitted this

day of September, 1990.

CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

Appellant Great-West
Life Assurance Company
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